Mental Immunity: Infectious Ideas, Mind-Parasites, and the Search for a Better Way to Think

 The Subtle Art of Challenge Regulation It’s easy to assume that a challenger is always within his rights to issue bare challenges. In fact, countless philosophers have assumed just this. This is understandable, given that interesting and controversial claims—the sort that need backing—occupy the foreground, while uncontroversial claims keep a lower profile. But philosophers who make the incautious generalization invariably find that reason regresses. Remember Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus? Entire schools of ancient philosophy managed to convince themselves that iterated bare challenges undermine all claims to knowledge. They became indiscriminate critics and lost the support of more pragmatic thinkers. It’s hard to imagine, but these profoundly corrosive skepticisms persisted for centuries. In fact, they gave philosophy a reputation as thoroughly impractical and set the stage for a crushing anti-intellectual backlash. Ignorance, superstition, and moral disorientation then ruled Europe for a thousand years. Even the estimable David Hume convinced himself that bare challenges may be iterated almost indefinitely. You’ll recall his words: “If I ask why you believe any . . . matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact, connected with it.

Norman, Andy. Mental Immunity: Infectious Ideas, Mind-Parasites, and the Search for a Better Way to Think (p. 311). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.