Monday, September 11, 2017
Sunday, September 10, 2017
Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense
http://goo.gl/rocDJS
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf
Abstract Conventional network defense tools such as intrusion detection systems and anti-virus focus on the vulnerability component of risk, and traditional incident response methodology presupposes a successful intrusion. An evolution in the goals and sophistication of computer network intrusions has rendered these approaches insufficient for certain actors. A new class of threats, appropriately dubbed the “Advanced Persistent Threat” (APT), represents well-resourced and trained adversaries that conduct multi-year intrusion campaigns targeting highly sensitive economic, proprietary, or national security information. These adversaries accomplish their goals using advanced tools and techniques designed to defeat most conventional computer network defense mechanisms. Network defense techniques which leverage knowledge about these adversaries can create an intelligence feedback loop, enabling defenders to establish a state of information superiority which decreases the adversary’s likelihood of success with each subsequent intrusion attempt. Using a kill chain model to describe phases of intrusions, mapping adversary kill chain indicators to defender courses of action, identifying patterns that link individual intrusions into broader campaigns, and understanding the iterative nature of intelligence gathering form the basis of intelligence-driven computer network defense (CND). Institutionalization of this approach reduces the likelihood of adversary success, informs network defense investment and resource prioritization, and yields relevant metrics of performance and effectiveness. The evolution of advanced persistent threats necessitates an intelligence-based model because in this model the defenders mitigate not just vulnerability, but the threat component of risk, too.
Keywords: incident response, intrusion detection, intelligence, threat, APT, computer network defense
Ryan, J. J. C. H., & Ryan, J. J. C. H. (2011). Leading issues in information warfare & security research: Vol. 1. Reading, U.K: API.
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/documents/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf
Abstract Conventional network defense tools such as intrusion detection systems and anti-virus focus on the vulnerability component of risk, and traditional incident response methodology presupposes a successful intrusion. An evolution in the goals and sophistication of computer network intrusions has rendered these approaches insufficient for certain actors. A new class of threats, appropriately dubbed the “Advanced Persistent Threat” (APT), represents well-resourced and trained adversaries that conduct multi-year intrusion campaigns targeting highly sensitive economic, proprietary, or national security information. These adversaries accomplish their goals using advanced tools and techniques designed to defeat most conventional computer network defense mechanisms. Network defense techniques which leverage knowledge about these adversaries can create an intelligence feedback loop, enabling defenders to establish a state of information superiority which decreases the adversary’s likelihood of success with each subsequent intrusion attempt. Using a kill chain model to describe phases of intrusions, mapping adversary kill chain indicators to defender courses of action, identifying patterns that link individual intrusions into broader campaigns, and understanding the iterative nature of intelligence gathering form the basis of intelligence-driven computer network defense (CND). Institutionalization of this approach reduces the likelihood of adversary success, informs network defense investment and resource prioritization, and yields relevant metrics of performance and effectiveness. The evolution of advanced persistent threats necessitates an intelligence-based model because in this model the defenders mitigate not just vulnerability, but the threat component of risk, too.
Keywords: incident response, intrusion detection, intelligence, threat, APT, computer network defense
Ryan, J. J. C. H., & Ryan, J. J. C. H. (2011). Leading issues in information warfare & security research: Vol. 1. Reading, U.K: API.
lista de portas classificadas de acordo com o número de vulnerabilidades
Procuro uma lista de portas classificadas de
acordo com o número de vulnerabilidades que você pode encontrar para essa porta
específica (considerando, claro, o serviço instalado na porta padrão)?
Não pode haver tal lista, ou pelo menos, ela será exaustiva e necessita de constantes atualizações, por que as
vulnerabilidades não existem nas portas - elas existem
nos serviços. Enquanto os serviços normalmente podem ser executados em
uma determinada porta, não há nada para evitar, exemplo: executando um servidor
web (normalmente a porta 80) na porta 23 (normalmente usados para Telnet),
hospedando seu serviço IRC (normalmente porta 194) na porta 161 (normalmente
SNMP) ou configurando o Windows Terminal Services (também conhecido como RDP -
geralmente no 3389) host para a porta 56729 (uma porta incomum, geralmente não
usada para servidores).
Mesmo tentando construir uma contagem de
vulnerabilidades por serviço, é impreciso porque os serviços são fornecidos por
aplicativos e várias aplicações são capazes de fornecer um determinado serviço.
Por exemplo, um servidor Apache terá diferentes vulnerabilidades de um servidor
IIS, embora ambos ofereçam o mesmo serviço - HTTP.
O buraco fica cada vez mais profundo,
dependendo da forma como os aplicativos são criados ou de quais plug-ins ou
outros aplicativos estão sendo executados em cima deles.
Para uma avaliação de vulnerabilidade real,
você precisa olhar para o seu sistema e verificar o sistema operacional e
aplicativos contra um banco de dados de vulnerabilidades conhecidas (por
exemplo, OSVDB ou NIST NVD). Se você estiver procurando por descobrir quais os
serviços que você precisa para desativar ou bloquear devido à alta
vulnerabilidade. Basta desativar / bloquear tudo o que não é essencial para
suas operações e manter as que estão atualizadas e o com o devido patch.
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