Showing posts with label Iraqi Dinar. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraqi Dinar. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 14, 2026
Forensic Analysis of the Iraqi Dinar Investment Phenomenon: Macroeconomic Realities, Predatory Retail Arbitrage, and Regulatory Enforcement
Forensic Analysis of the Iraqi Dinar Investment Phenomenon: Macroeconomic Realities, Predatory Retail Arbitrage, and Regulatory Enforcement
Executive Forensic Appraisal: Deconstructing the Investment Thesis
For more than two decades, an active retail market has promoted the physical currency of Iraq—the Iraqi dinar (IQD)—as a speculative instrument capable of generating exponential financial returns1. The premise disseminated by currency vendors, online commentators, and promotional forums asserts that the dinar is substantially undervalued due to post-war reconstruction constraints, international sanctions, or geopolitical suppression1. Promoters promise an imminent, state-mandated event termed an overnight "revaluation" (RV) or "reinstatement" (RI), which they claim will adjust the exchange rate from a fraction of a cent to parity or several U.S. dollars per dinar1.
Rigorous financial, macroeconomic, and legal analysis demonstrates that the Iraqi dinar investment thesis is not an authentic speculative asset class, but a persistent, structured retail foreign exchange fraud1. While the Iraqi dinar is a legitimate sovereign currency issued by the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) to facilitate domestic trade, its secondary promotion to retail investors functions through deceptive business practices designed to extract capital from retail purchasers1.
This scheme operates through two interdependent mechanisms. First, commercial currency brokers acquire authentic physical dinar notes at wholesale rates and resell them to retail consumers at markups ranging from 20% to more than 60%, transferring an illiquid, non-convertible paper instrument to the purchaser while securing an immediate, risk-free profit for the vendor1. Second, an informal ecosystem of unlicensed commentators, affiliate marketers, and internet operators generates continuous, unfalsifiable narratives concerning secret international treaties, impending banking resets, and imminent wealth redemptions1. This secondary apparatus preserves speculative enthusiasm, discourages buyers from attempting liquidation, and creates secondary demand for reserve contracts, paid subscription services, and advance-fee recovery operations1. The broader regulatory and judicial landscape corroborates this assessment: the enterprise has been the target of multiple felony convictions in federal courts, substantial civil enforcement actions by regulatory commissions, and formal fraud advisories across international, federal, and state jurisdictions1.
Macroeconomic Equilibrium and the Arithmetic Impossibility of Revaluation
The foundational economic assumption of the dinar promotion—that a sovereign government can artificially revalue its currency several thousand-fold overnight without reference to national output or reserve backing—contradicts modern monetary theory and the empirical balance sheet of the Central Bank of Iraq1.
The Central Bank of Iraq manages the dinar under an administered currency peg to the U.S. dollar, established to anchor domestic prices within an economy where crude oil exports generate over 90% of state fiscal revenue and finance almost all merchandise imports14. Rather than trading freely on international currency exchanges, the dinar’s nominal rate is set administratively by the CBI and executed through the Foreign Exchange Electronic Platform and interbank foreign exchange windows15. The official interbank rate is pegged in the range of 1,300 to 1,320 IQD per U.S. dollar, giving a single dinar an effective value of approximately USD15. Administrative rate adjustments undertaken by the CBI to defend domestic reserves have consistently moved toward devaluation rather than upward appreciation, including the December 2020 shift to 1,450 IQD per dollar and subsequent operational adjustments reaching 1,510 IQD per dollar at primary banks1.
Parallel market exchange rates in Iraqi financial centers typically trade at a noticeable spread above the official peg, often between 1,400 and 1,500 IQD per dollar15. This differential reflects structural domestic demand for physical greenbacks driven by informal regional commerce, local capital flight, and stringent compliance audits enforced by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to prevent unauthorized dollar diversion11. The presence of an elevated parallel cash market underscores ongoing downward market pressure on the dinar rather than hidden upward market momentum15.
The core arithmetical fallacy promoted to retail buyers is that the dinar will appreciate to parity () or reinstate to its pre-1990 rate of 1. The scale of this claim collapses under basic monetary aggregation. Following decades of monetization to finance government deficits, Iraq’s physical currency in circulation () has expanded to between 100 trillion and 111 trillion dinars, while broad money supply () stands between 174 trillion and 181 trillion dinars1.
The implied sovereign cash obligation resulting from any exchange rate adjustment can be expressed as:
Applying the promotional targets to this baseline highlights the scale of the discrepancy:
If broad money () of 174 trillion dinars were evaluated at the advertised rate, the resulting sovereign liability would reach 22.
By comparison, the gross domestic product of the entire world economy is roughly . The promotional hypothesis assumes that a single developing nation with a nominal annual GDP of approximately could, by sovereign fiat, issue currency claims valued at more than three times the total economic production of the globe1.
Macroeconomic Metric
Official Central Bank of Iraq Reality
Guru Revaluation Claim ($3.22 Rate)
Structural Discrepancy Factor
Exchange Rate (IQD/USD)
[cite: 1, 19]
[cite: 1]
Over divergence
Implied Individual Note ()
[cite: 1, 15]
[cite: 11]
Over divergence
Circulating Physical Notes ()
[cite: 1]
Nominal note supply unchanged
Baseline volume identical
Nominal Value of in USD
[cite: 1, 15]
[cite: 1]
Factor of beyond reserves
Broad Money Supply ()
[cite: 22, 23, 24]
Nominal liquidity unchanged
Baseline volume identical
Total Foreign Currency & Gold Reserves
[cite: 1, 15]
Asserted to back hundreds of trillions2
Reserve deficit exceeds
Comparative Economic Scale
Iraq GDP
Exceeds Global GDP ()1
total global production
A sovereign currency peg is defended through a central bank's foreign exchange and gold reserves1. Iraq maintains approximately in gross official foreign reserves, supplemented by roughly 130 to 150 tonnes of monetary gold1. These holdings provide a stable cushion of approximately nine months of domestic import cover, which aligns with international standards for hydrocarbon-dependent economies15. However, this reserve base is configured to support the current 111 trillion dinar float at its official pegged range1. Were the Central Bank of Iraq to declare an arbitrary revaluation to or even parity, the entire national reserve portfolio would be wiped out in moments by capital flight as market participants exchanged dinars for convertibility into U.S. dollars1.
Deconstruction of Core Promotional Fallacies and Pseudolegal Lore
To bypass basic balance sheet constraints, promoters construct alternative historical narratives, misinterpret standard monetary policies, and cite irrelevant legal statutes2.
A common historical analogy circulated by dinar promoters is the recovery of the Kuwaiti dinar (KWD) after the 1991 Gulf War27. Promoters assert that Kuwait's currency collapsed during the Iraqi invasion and that speculators who purchased cheap notes secured fortunes when the currency was restored to more than 28. This comparison misrepresents historical facts27. During the occupation, the legitimate Kuwaiti government-in-exile retained its sovereign wealth assets and substantial foreign exchange reserves abroad, meaning its national creditworthiness was never compromised19.
The Iraqi occupation authority attempted to invalidate the Kuwaiti dinar and replace it with Iraqi currency3. While speculative black-market trades in occupied areas fluctuated around steep discounts (), the official fundamental peg was never devalued to fractional pennies27. Upon liberation in 1991, Kuwait demonetized banknote series stolen from the central bank vaults, issued a replacement series, and honored its original peg at historical parity3. Kuwait never hyperinflated its physical currency supply, which stands in contrast to Iraq, where the central bank printed tens of trillions of unbacked dinars across the 1990s, permanently altering the currency's baseline supply3.
A second foundational distortion is the conflation of a currency redenomination with a real exchange rate revaluation2. Central Bank of Iraq officials and parliamentary finance committees have periodically debated administrative plans to "delete the zeros" from the currency2. Redenomination is a standard accounting mechanism employed by central banks to improve transaction processing and reduce cash-handling volume following historical inflation2. In a three-zero redenomination, a central bank issues a new banknote series where are exchanged for 30.
Critically, all domestic wages, commodity prices, bank account ledgers, and nominal foreign exchange quotes are adjusted by the identical divisor30. The exchange rate shifts from approximately to 31. The real purchasing power of the currency holder remains unchanged: a bundle of 1,000 old dinars originally worth becomes 1 new dinar worth 2. Dinar promoters deceive retail investors by suggesting that the central bank will delete the zeros exclusively from the exchange rate while allowing retail holders to cash out their existing high-denomination banknotes at a 1:1 ratio with the U.S. dollar2. Under an authentic redenomination, existing 25,000 dinar notes would simply be converted into 25 new dinars, maintaining their exact baseline dollar value of roughly 30.
Promoters also rely on fabricated legal authorities and international mandates to persuade prospective buyers2. Community forums routinely cite U.S. Executive Order 13303 as a statutory shield guaranteeing tax-free returns and formalizing retail investment rights in the dinar3. In reality, Executive Order 13303, titled Protection of the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain Other Property in Which Iraq Has an Interest, was signed in May 2003 to protect Iraqi oil sales, central bank assets, and reconstruction funds from judicial attachment or seizure by creditors with claims against the previous political regime3. The order does not mention retail currency trading, secondary market speculation, or preferential tax treatment3.
Similarly, claims that the International Monetary Fund has mandated an immediate upward revaluation as a prerequisite for Iraq’s integration into international trade platforms conflict with published IMF surveillance2. IMF Article IV consultations advise Iraq to maintain a stable, credible foreign exchange policy, reduce non-essential public sector payrolls, and build fiscal buffers to mitigate oil price volatility2. The IMF has repeatedly characterized speculative overnight revaluations as economically unfeasible2. Promotional claims that United Nations Chapter VII sanctions suppressed the dinar are equally baseless; the UN Security Council formally closed the primary Gulf War sanctions files years ago without altering the dinar's managed peg3.
Socio-Psychological Dynamics, Conspiratorial Convergence, and Affinity Exploitation
Over its twenty-year history, the dinar speculative community has transformed from an aggressive retail foreign exchange trade into an insular socio-psychological subculture that merges alternative finance with populist conspiracy narratives2.
As year after year passed without the promised revaluation, the narrative infrastructure integrated wider internet-based conspiracy lore to account for continuous operational failures1. The dinar became linked to the Global Currency Reset (GCR) theory, which claims that sovereign nations have organized an off-ledger treaty to simultaneously restore all national currencies to gold or resource backing2. This framework merged with NESARA/GESARA mythology, which promises universal personal debt forgiveness, the abolition of the Federal Reserve and national tax authorities, and the release of concealed humanitarian trusts11. Promoters also incorporate the concept of a Quantum Financial System (QFS), claiming that the global banking network is shifting to an asset-backed quantum ledger designed to bypass traditional regulatory reporting and SWIFT oversight11.
To provide retail participants with a structured role within this fictional architecture, promoters developed an internal classification system26. Sovereign nations and government accounts are designated as Tier 1 and Tier 2, while institutional groups and historical bondholders comprise Tier 3 and Tier 4A26. Retail purchasers of Iraqi dinars, Vietnamese dong, and demonetized Zimbabwean notes are categorized as "Tier 4B" or the "Internet Group"26.
Promoters circulate daily alerts claiming that Tier 4B notifications are hours away and that private investors will receive a secure 800 telephone number to arrange private redemption appointments at specialized banking facilities26. At these non-existent facilities, holders are told they will execute non-disclosure agreements and redeem their physical notes at elevated "contract rates" well above any public quote2.
The longevity of the dinar scheme relies on defined psychological retention techniques1:
First, promoters maintain urgency by continuously moving operational deadlines1. Imminent wealth events are pinned to upcoming holidays, quarterly budget announcements, or international diplomatic summits2. When a deadline elapses without incident, leaders attribute the delay to procedural sabotage by entrenched financial institutions, international political interference, or administrative adjustments, immediately substituting a new target date1.
Second, the community enforces information inversion1. Official denials, fraud warnings from banking regulators, and monetary tightening policies announced by the Central Bank of Iraq are systematically reinterpreted as coordinated disinformation campaigns designed to shake out weak participants and conceal wealth redemptions from the public1.
Third, communal echo chambers enforce ideological uniformity1. Discussion forums and teleconference channels ban participants who introduce central bank balance sheet data, basic arithmetic calculations, or regulatory warnings, characterizing analytical skepticism as disloyalty, negativity, or a lack of personal conviction1.
Fourth, the psychological sunk-cost trap makes participants vulnerable to secondary exploitation1. Investors who have committed capital and tied their financial security to an imminent revaluation frequently fall prey to advance-fee recovery schemes1. In these secondary frauds, actors contact past currency purchasers and demand upfront administrative, legal, or document-processing fees under the pretext of enrolling their note serial numbers into private exchange pools or VIP liquidity accounts1.
Transaction Mechanics, Predatory Spreads, and Terminal Illiquidity
Aside from the macroeconomic impossibility of a currency revaluation, retail purchasers face an operational structure defined by severe transactional markups and an absence of exit liquidity1.
In standard institutional foreign exchange markets, major and liquid currency pairs trade with bid-ask spreads below 0.05%. In contrast, the market for physical Iraqi dinar banknotes functions through unregulated commercial dealers who extract immediate arbitrage spreads from retail buyers1. Retail vendors charge customers between to purchase a 1,000,000 IQD package1. Based on the official Central Bank of Iraq peg, that same one million dinars holds an institutional value of approximately 1. The retail dealer captures an upfront premium of 38% to 70% above spot value1.
When a retail purchaser attempts to liquidate notes, the spread operates in reverse1. The few dealers willing to repurchase physical notes offer prices well below the interbank rate, typically around per million dinars1. The retail buyer realizes an immediate capital loss of 50% to 65% simply by executing the round-trip transaction1.
Transaction Component
Official Institutional Baseline
Retail Currency Vendor Operation
Investor Net Impact
Purchase Price (1,000,000 IQD)
[cite: 15, 19]
[cite: 1, 3]
Immediate premium loss of
[cite: 1]
Wholesale Interbank Spread
(Liquid currency pairs)
above benchmark spot1
Guaranteed dealer profit on entry1
Dealer Buy-Back Bid (Liquidation)
[cite: 15]
[cite: 1, 7]
Immediate liquidation haircut of
[cite: 1, 7]
Total Round-Trip Capital Drain
Nominal clearing costs
Retail investor loses
Immediate capital destruction of
[cite: 1, 7]
Secondary Market Convertibility
Full institutional settlement
Unregulated, OTC private liquidity only8
Structural illiquidity and execution friction1
Retail holders are unable to mitigate these losses through standard commercial banking channels10. Major international and commercial banking institutions, including JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Citibank, do not buy, sell, exchange, or accept physical Iraqi dinar banknotes for deposit8. Established banks maintain explicit foreign exchange compliance policies refusing physical dinar transactions due to sovereign peg constraints, absence of institutional settlement pipelines, and anti-money laundering risks8.
Furthermore, retail buyers cannot bypass these domestic banking barriers by traveling to Iraq to redeem their physical notes10. Central Bank of Iraq monetary regulations and national customs border laws impose strict legal limits on the cross-border transit of physical cash10. Iraqi customs guidelines prohibit entering or exiting the country with physical dinar amounts exceeding domestic travel limits, and undeclared currency shipments above equivalent are subject to confiscation, fines, and criminal arrest41. Commercial-scale physical holdings accumulated by retail investors cannot be legally exported into Iraq for local interbank conversion10. As a result, the physical banknotes remain illiquid paper assets stored in private residences6.
Regulatory Enforcement, Judicial Precedents, and Criminal Jurisprudence
Federal regulatory agencies and federal prosecutors have repeatedly rejected the claim that marketing the dinar is an ordinary, unregulated foreign exchange activity8. Federal jurisprudence establishes that selling physical banknotes alongside fabricated representations of imminent appreciation constitutes criminal mail and wire fraud8.
The legal precedent governing this sector was established in United States v. Rhame, Shaw, and Bell, which targeted Sterling Currency Group (operating as Dinar Banker)8. Between 2004 and 2015, Sterling emerged as one of the largest retail dinar brokers in North America, grossing more than from over 100,000 retail purchasers8.
The company's operations included deceptive marketing practices: Sterling promoted false assertions of an imminent revaluation on company websites and investor calls, funded online forums (such as the "GET Team") to seed speculative rumors, deceived customers by falsely claiming to be constructing physical airport exchange kiosks for post-RV liquidation, and made false statements to FBI investigators regarding these marketing operations8.
Following a five-week jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, principals Tyson Rhame, James Shaw, and Frank Bell were convicted of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, substantive mail and wire fraud, and making false statements to federal officials8. Tyson Rhame was sentenced to 180 months in federal prison, James Shaw received 95 months, and COO Frank Bell was sentenced to 84 months8.
On appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the defendants argued that their actions could not constitute fraud as a matter of law because purchasers had received genuine, authentic foreign currency banknotes8. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this defense:
"A jury could reasonably have found that Rhame, Shaw, and Bell deceived investors about a core attribute of the dinar: the odds of its appreciation. Investors were led to believe that their dinars would imminently skyrocket in value. That high probability of profit was an essential characteristic of the asset that investors thought they were purchasing."
[cite: 8]
The appellate court affirmed the convictions, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied subsequent petitions for certiorari, confirming that selling authentic banknotes on manufactured claims of imminent appreciation constitutes federal fraud8.
Target Entity / Defendant
Adjudicating Body
Statutory Charges & Disposition
Operational Profile & Fraud Mechanics
Sterling Currency Group (T. Rhame, J. Shaw, F. Bell)
DOJ / FBI / U.S. District Court (N.D. Ga.)
Conspiracy, mail fraud, wire fraud, false statements; prison terms of 180, 95, and 84 months affirmed8
Sold over ; ran fraudulent layaway programs, paid secret forum kickbacks, fabricated airport redemption kiosks8
Dinar Corp / My Monex (Husam U. Tayeh)
DOJ / CFTC / FBI (C.D. Ill. / Mobile, AL)
Guilty plea to wire fraud; CFTC secured civil enforcement judgment1
Unregistered MSB offering installment "reserve" programs for dinar and dong; failed to hold physical currency reserves1
BH Group / FIIC (Brad L. Huebner, et al.)
DOJ / FBI / U.S. District Court (N.D. Ohio)
Multiple trial convictions; sentences up to 87 months affirmed by 6th Circuit1
Defrauded over 150 investors of using dinar pitches and fictitious hedge funds with fake U.S. Treasury ties1
William Burbank
DOJ / USAO (S.D.N.Y.)
Guilty plea to federal wire fraud charges in 20191
Executed Ponzi-style dinar trading pool targeting over 150 retail investors, predominantly military veterans1
Joshua Jay Hansen
SEC / U.S. District Court (D. Utah)
Civil enforcement action alleging federal securities violations13
Defrauded retail investors of via an unregistered, purported "top secret" dinar investment vehicle13
Unregistered Promoters
Washington State DFI
Multiple enforcement actions and formal administrative consent orders1
Sanctioned entities offering dinar "bonds" and taking funds for physical deliveries that never materialized1
Retail Currency Dealers
Texas SSB / Utah Dept. of Commerce / Alabama Sec. Comm.
Recurring public cease-and-desist alerts and Top Investment Scam listings1
Formal state alerts detailing total lack of liquidity, dealer price manipulation, and absence of banking redemption6
Institutional Forensic Conclusions
The empirical evidence from central bank balance sheets, foreign exchange mechanics, psychological abuse patterns, and federal criminal case law leads to a clear conclusion: the Iraqi dinar investment thesis is a predatory financial fraud1.
The operation extracts capital from retail participants through an asymmetric structure:
Currency dealers capture guaranteed, immediate profits by levying markups of 20% to 60%+ on the sale of an illiquid paper banknote1. The promotional apparatus rationalizes persistent delays by manufacturing unfalsifiable conspiracy theories involving global financial resets, private redemption tiers, and secret military protocols2. This messaging prevents liquidation attempts and primes participants for secondary advance-fee recovery scams1.
Meanwhile, physical currency holders face severe structural barriers: a circulating money supply that precludes upward revaluation by multiple orders of magnitude, a complete absence of secondary exchange mechanisms across commercial banking networks, and legal restrictions that prohibit repatriating notes to Iraq1.
Capital committed to physical Iraqi dinars under expectations of an administrative revaluation represents a near-total loss1. Market participants, retail consumers, and financial institutions should treat promotional claims of an imminent revaluation as deceptive marketing, cease all secondary currency purchases, avoid advance-fee recovery programs, and evaluate sovereign foreign exchange exclusively through verified institutional balance sheets and regulated clearing frameworks1.
Works cited
Iraqi Dinar Scam: Is the RV Real? Claims, Facts and Red Flags, https://dinarscams.com/
The Iraqi Dinar Revaluation Deception: 10 Persistent False Claims, https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2025/09/28/the-iraqi-dinar-revaluation-deception-10-persistent-false-claims-exposed/
Dinar Exchange Rate Linked to Oil Exports, Federal Reserves, https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2013/08/28/dinar-exchange-rate-linked-to-oil-exports-federal-reserves/
Don't Be Fooled By the Iraqi Dinar Scam - InvestorPlace, https://investorplace.com/2014/06/iraqi-dinar-scam/
What is the Iraqi dinar scam? - Quora, https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-Iraqi-dinar-scam
Investor Alert: Guess Who's Coming to Dinar?, https://ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/investor-alert-guess-whos-coming-dinar
Iraqi Dinar Scam: Is the RV Real? Claims, Facts and Red Flags, https://dinarfacts.com/
United States Court of Appeals, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-972/339959/20250123123931755_24A-XXXX_appendix.pdf
Concerned About Currency Scams?... - Money Talks by SafeDinar, https://www.safedinar.com/money-talks/currency-scams-staying-safe/
DFI Alert: Iraqi Dinar Scams | Washington State, https://www.atg.wa.gov/dfi-alert-iraqi-dinar-scams
The Truth Behind The Iraqi Dinar RV And Global Currency Reset, https://g2innovation.co.uk/rv-global-currency-reset-rumors-m334.html
Seeking Victim Information in Dinar Corp. Investigation - FBI.gov, https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/victim-services/seeking-victim-information/seeking-victim-information-in-dinar-corp-investigation
Dinar Scam | Courthouse News Service, https://www.courthousenews.com/dinar-scam/
Iraq Currency Overhaul Plan: IQD 2026 - Dinar Exchange, https://dinarexchange.com.au/news/iraq-currency-reform-dinar-boost-2026
Iraq's $17B Development Road: The Dinar's Next Chapter, https://planetbanknote.com/banknote-blog/iraqs-17b-development-road-the-dinars-next-chapter/
Iraqi Dinar Future Prediction: Good Forex Investment? - Ultima Markets, https://www.ultimamarkets.com/academy/iraqi-dinar-future-prediction-good-forex-investment/
Forex Iraqi Dinar: Is It a Good Investment in 2025?, https://www.ebc.com/forex/forex-iraqi-dinar-is-it-a-good-investment-in
Measuring and analyzing the relationship between the exchange, https://www.theeconomicsjournal.com/archives/2025/vol8issue2/PartA/8-2-21-995.pdf
Iraqi Dinar News 2026: Technical Analysis Of CBI Monetary Policy, https://mrpilgrim.co.uk/news-2026-technical-analysis-cbi-o4bz.html
Iraq has devalued its currency, changing the official exchange rate, https://www.facebook.com/alarabiya.english/posts/iraq-has-devalued-its-currency-changing-the-official-exchange-rate-from-around-1/1560214612810220/
FinCEN Advisory on the Iranian Regime's Illicit Oil Smuggling, https://www.fincen.gov/system/files/advisory/2025-06-06/FinCEN-Advisory-Illicit-Oil-Smuggling-508.pdf
Econometrical Analyzing the Effect of MSC on Poverty and, http://www.iemsjl.org/journal/article.php?code=99021
An Evaluation of the Central Bank of Iraq's Performance Against Its, https://nidabacapital.org/2026/06/15/an-evaluation-of-the-central-bank-of-iraqs-performance-against-its-statutory-mandate-2008-2023/
Currency Redenomination: Can Hoarded Money Be Accessed at, https://www.bayancenter.org/en/2026/09/12997/
Inside the Iraqi Dinar Guru Hustle: How False RV Promises Hooked, https://kampanje.smp.no/inside-the-iraqi-dinar-guru/
Judy Byington GCR - Dinar Detectives - Dinar Detectives, https://dinardetectives.com/judy-byington-gcr/
Why is purchasing the Iraqi Dinar a scam? - Reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/Scams/comments/1ffkbhl/why_is_purchasing_the_iraqi_dinar_a_scam/
Long-running scam involves foreign currency | KSL.com, https://www.ksl.com/article/news/utah/long-running-scam-involves-foreign-currency/28221507
Why The Iraqi Dinar Is Different - YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=571U5KNplOs
Delete zeros from the Iraqi dinar: between the technical instrument, https://hewariraq.com/en/post/970/delete-zeros-from-dinar-al-iraqi-between-tool-technical-condition-reform-structural
Please HELP decipher emails from our congressman - Dinar Vets, https://dinarvets.com/forums/?app=core&module=system&controller=content&do=find&content_class=forums_Topic&content_id=78139&content_commentid=605408
he Dinar Recaps Team - Constant Contact, https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Dinar-Recaps-5-20-10pm-Newsletter.html?soid=1105984884317&aid=jzSftpqVcgw
Restored Republic via a GCR: Update as of July 19, 2023, https://dinarchronicles.com/2023/07/19/restored-republic-via-a-gcr-update-as-of-july-19-2023/
2026 ISSN: 2581-4664 THE FEASIBILITY OF APPLYIN, https://ijbmer.org/uploads2026/BMER_9_733.pdf
The Iraqi Dinar scam is resurfacing and it's sad. - Reddit, https://www.reddit.com/r/Scams/comments/1bwnazv/the_iraqi_dinar_scam_is_resurfacing_and_its_sad/
Judy Byington: Restored Republic via a GCR – October 14, 2026, https://dinardetectives.com/judy-byington-restored-gcr-october-14-2026/
Judy Byington: Restored Republic via a GCR — October 11, 2026, https://dinardetectives.com/judy-byington-restored-republic-gcr-october-11-2026/
Judy Byington - Dinar Detectives - Dinar Detectives, https://dinardetectives.com/judy-byington-232/
Iraqi Dinar Redenomination Centers; Fact or Scam? - Vocal Media, https://vocal.media/trader/iraqi-dinar-redenomination-centers-fact-or-scam
Foreign Currency Information FAQs - Bank of America, https://www.bankofamerica.com/foreign-exchange/currency-exchange-faq/
Iraq Travel Advisory | Travel.State.gov, https://travel.state.gov/en/international-travel/travel-advisories/iraq.html
Bell v. United States - Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/d9/2025-07/24-972_bell_et_al_opp_final.pdf
Owners of currency exchange business that made $600 million, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/owners-currency-exchange-business-made-600-million-convicted-fraud
Petition - In the Supreme Court of the United States, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-972/351473/20250307130500311_24A-XXXX_cert_petition.pdf
Investors were sent false daily statements showing the supposed, https://www.facebook.com/ChannelNewsAsia/posts/investors-were-sent-false-daily-statements-showing-the-supposed-forex-trades-sai/10158842222607934/
Virginia Man Pleads Guilty To Defrauding Investors Of $2 Million In, https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/virginia-man-pleads-guilty-defrauding-investors-2-million-iraqi-dinar-fraud-scheme
SCAM ALERT - Alabama Securities Commission, https://asc.alabama.gov/for-investors/investor-education/scam-alert/
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)