Executive Summary
Between the years 2023 and late 2025, the American digital public square—specifically the platform X (formerly Twitter)—underwent a structural transformation that fundamentally altered the nature of political discourse in the United States. This report provides an exhaustive analysis of a phenomenon widely observed but only recently quantified: the mass displacement of authentic American voices by a convergence of state-sponsored information operations and commercial "engagement farming" networks operating from abroad.
The investigation reveals that the "MAGA" (Make America Great Again) ecosystem on X, ostensibly a movement of American grassroots conservatism, has been heavily colonized by foreign entities. This colonization is not a singular event but the result of two distinct forces. First, adversarial state actors—primarily the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russian Federation, and the Islamic Republic of Iran—have evolved their tradecraft from simple bot automation to sophisticated "MAGAflage," the mimicry of hyper-partisan American identities to exploit domestic social fissures. Second, and perhaps more pervasive in sheer volume, is the rise of the "mercenary influencer." Driven by X’s ad revenue sharing model, networks in Nigeria, India, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia have industrialized "rage-baiting," adopting American political aesthetics not for ideological reasons, but because US political polarization is the most lucrative engagement metric in the global attention economy.
The culmination of these trends occurred in November 2025 with the release of X’s "About This Account" transparency feature. This tool inadvertently "unmasked" thousands of prominent accounts, revealing that major drivers of pro-Trump, anti-institutional, and culture-war discourse were operating from locations such as Lagos, Moscow, and Bangkok. This report argues that we are witnessing a crisis of "Algorithmic Displacement," where the authentic concerns of the American electorate are systematically drowned out by a synthesis of foreign intelligence operations and global digital arbitrage, creating a "Liar's Dividend" that erodes trust in all digital communication.
Chapter 1: The New Geopolitics of the Digital Square
The trajectory of foreign influence operations targeting the United States has shifted from the automated amplification of the 2016 era to the psychological infiltration of the 2024–2025 cycle. While the "bot" remains a tool, the primary weapon is now the "persona"—a curated, culturally competent, and often AI-enhanced identity designed to pass as an authentic participant in American civic life.
1.1 The Russian Federation: From "Active Measures" to "Doppelganger"
Russia remains the most persistent and aggressive actor in the disinformation space, viewing the American information environment as a theater of war. By late 2024, Russian operations had moved beyond the "troll farm" model of the Internet Research Agency (IRA) to a more decentralized and technically sophisticated ecosystem involving private political strategists and state apparatuses.
The "Doppelganger" Infrastructure
The centerpiece of Russian operations in the 2024 cycle was the "Doppelganger" campaign. Unlike previous efforts that relied heavily on organic social media posts, Doppelganger utilized a technique known as "cybersquatting" to hijack the credibility of legitimate Western media. Operatives registered domains that mimicked the URLs of trusted outlets—such as The Washington Post, Fox News, and Der Spiegel—often changing a single character (e.g., .ltd instead of .com).1
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) confirmed the seizure of 32 such domains in September 2024, tracing them to Russian companies like the Social Design Agency (SDA), Structura National Technology, and ANO Dialog.1 These entities operated under the direct direction of the Russian Presidential Administration, specifically First Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko.1 The strategic logic was to create a "hall of mirrors": a user on X would click a link appearing to be a legitimate news story about US economic failure or Ukrainian corruption, only to be directed to a Russian-controlled site hosting fabricated content.
"Meliorator" and the AI-Enhanced Bot Farm
To disseminate these fabricated narratives, Russian actors deployed "Meliorator," a bespoke AI-enhanced software suite identified by the FBI and international partners in the Netherlands and Canada.2 Meliorator represented a generational leap in automated propaganda. It allowed operators to:
Create Fictitious Profiles at Scale: The software generated unique biographical details, photos, and posting histories for thousands of "American" accounts, bypassing standard bot detection filters that look for duplicate metadata.2
Cross-Platform Coordination: While primarily active on X, Meliorator was designed to manage personas across multiple platforms, creating a cohesive "digital footprint" that made the fake Americans appear real to casual observers.3
Narrative Laundering: These bots were not merely retweeting; they were sharing links to the Doppelganger sites, adding AI-generated commentary that mimicked the vernacular of frustrated American conservatives.2
The "CopyCop" network, a subset of this activity, utilized Large Language Models (LLMs) to scrape legitimate articles from mainstream and conservative US media, rewrite them with a pro-Kremlin slant, and republish them on "camouflaged" websites.4 This content was then amplified by the Meliorator bots, creating an artificial consensus around Russian strategic objectives—primarily the cessation of aid to Ukraine and the erosion of trust in US electoral integrity.
1.2 The People’s Republic of China: The Rise of "MAGAflage"
Historically, Chinese information operations (IO) were characterized by a defensive posture, focusing on narratives related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang, or Taiwan, often delivered in stilted, unnatural English. In the 2024–2025 period, however, Beijing’s tactics underwent a radical evolution, characterized by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) as "MAGAflage".5
The "Spamouflage" Pivot
The network known variously as "Spamouflage," "Dragonbridge," or "Taizi Flood" shifted its focus to deep infiltration of the US conservative ecosystem. Rather than defending China, these accounts began posing as fervent American patriots, exploiting the "MAGA" brand to camouflage their origins.6
Graphika’s ATLAS intelligence reporting identified a sophisticated cluster of accounts on X, TikTok, and YouTube that utilized AI-generated profile pictures of "average Americans"—bearded men in trucks, suburban mothers, veterans—and populated their bios with patriotic keywords ("Constitution," "2nd Amendment," "Ultra MAGA").7 This visual and textual mimicry allowed Chinese operatives to bypass the skepticism usually accorded to foreign accounts.
Narrative Strategy: Chaos Maximization
Unlike Russia, which often has a clear preference for candidates who disrupt NATO, China’s strategy appeared to be one of "chaos maximization." The Spamouflage network disseminated content denigrating politicians across the spectrum, targeting President Biden, former President Trump, and Vice President Harris with equal vitriol.6
The content focused on portraying the United States as a failing state. Key themes included:
Urban Decay: Viral videos of homelessness, drug addiction, and crime in American cities, framed as evidence of systemic democratic failure.7
Social Division: Amplifying divisive rhetoric around gun control, racial inequality, and the Israel-Hamas conflict to discourage voter turnout and sow cynicism.7
Corrupt Leadership: Promoting narratives that both parties were irredeemably corrupt, thereby undermining faith in the electoral process itself.6
In one notable instance, a Spamouflage persona operating as an inauthentic media outlet on TikTok garnered 1.5 million views with a video highlighting American political dysfunction, demonstrating that these "fake Americans" were successfully breaking out of their echo chambers to reach real audiences.7
1.3 The Islamic Republic of Iran: Cyber-Enabled Discord
Iran’s entry into the 2024–2025 influence landscape was distinguished by its aggressive use of cyber-enabled tactics and a late-stage surge in activity. Microsoft Threat Intelligence noted that while Iranian operations started slowly, they accelerated rapidly as the election approached, distinguishing themselves from Russian campaigns by their focus on "election conduct" rather than just voter persuasion.4
The Dual-Narrative Approach
Iranian operatives demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the polarized American electorate by running parallel operations targeting opposite ends of the political spectrum. They established covert news sites that catered to distinct demographics:
Nio Thinker: A site targeting liberal audiences with anti-Trump content, mocking his policies and persona.
Savannah Time: A site targeting conservative audiences with anti-LGBTQ content and critiques of gender-affirming care.8
This "play both sides" strategy reveals that Tehran’s objective was not merely to elect a specific candidate but to widen the fissures in American society, ensuring that regardless of the winner, the United States would remain internally fractured and distracted.
AI and Hacking
Iranian groups also leveraged Generative AI to produce content. OpenAI reported banning accounts linked to Iranian influence operations that were using ChatGPT to generate social media posts about the US presidential campaign.9 Furthermore, Iranian actors engaged in "hack-and-leak" operations, sending spear-phishing emails to high-ranking campaign officials, reminiscent of Russian tactics in 2016.8 This combination of cyber-intrusion and AI-generated propaganda marked a significant escalation in Iranian capabilities.
Chapter 2: The Mercenary Economy of Rage
While state actors pose a severe national security threat, the sheer volume of inauthentic "MAGA" content on X is largely driven by a different force: global economic inequality and the platform’s monetization structure. This report identifies the "Mercenary Influencer" as a critical, yet often overlooked, component of the disinformation ecosystem.
2.1 The Monetization of Polarization
Following Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter, the platform introduced an "Ads Revenue Sharing" program. To qualify, users needed to subscribe to X Premium (formerly Twitter Blue), garner a minimum number of organic impressions (initially 15 million, later reduced to 5 million), and have at least 500 followers.11
This policy created a direct financial incentive for "engagement farming." In the attention economy, the most efficient way to generate millions of impressions is not through nuanced policy analysis, but through "rage-baiting"—posting inflammatory, emotionally charged content that compels users to react.14 The "MAGA" ecosystem, with its high levels of affective polarization and strong in-group signaling, became the most profitable niche for these commercial actors.15
2.2 The Lagos-Moscow-Bangkok Axis
The economics of the X revenue share model created a massive arbitrage opportunity for individuals in the Global South and developing economies. A payout of a few hundred US dollars—negligible for an American user—represents a significant monthly income in countries like Nigeria, India, or Thailand.12
The Nigerian Hub
Investigation into the "About This Account" data revealed a high concentration of "MAGA" accounts operating from Nigeria. Guides on "How to Make Money on Twitter (X) in Nigeria" proliferated, explicitly instructing users to join "engagement groups" on Telegram or WhatsApp.12 In these groups, users coordinate to like, retweet, and reply to each other’s posts to artificially inflate impressions and trigger payouts.
Accounts such as "IvankaNews" (1 million followers) and "MAGA Scope" (51,000 followers) were exposed as Nigerian-operated entities.17 These accounts were not ideologically driven; they were "digital content mills" churning out memes like "Should a statue of Jesus be built on the White House lawn?" or questions about "illegal immigration" because they knew these topics would generate the engagement required to earn a paycheck.15
Eastern Europe and Asia
The commercial farming phenomenon extended beyond Africa. The account "MAGANationX" (400,000 followers), which billed itself as a "Patriot Voice for We The People," was traced to Eastern Europe (outside the EU).17 Similarly, "Dark Maga" (15,000 followers) was found to be operating from Thailand, and "MAGA Beacon" from South Asia.17 These regions possess robust IT sectors and digital marketing workforces that have readily pivoted to political clickbait farming.
2.3 Case Study: Stolen Valor and Stolen Faces (The "Eva" Network)
A particularly insidious tactic employed by these networks is the theft of identity. An investigation by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR), in collaboration with CNN, uncovered a network of fake accounts posing as young, female Trump supporters to attract engagement from the predominantly male conservative user base.18
The account "Eva_maga1996" presented itself as a young American woman living in the US, posting photos of herself in a "MAGA" hat and expressing strong views against the Democratic Party and LGBTQ+ rights. In reality, "Eva" did not exist. The photos were stolen from the Instagram profile of a Danish fashion influencer. The red baseball cap in the photos had been digitally altered to include the "MAGA" logo—but the editors failed to reverse the text for the selfie perspective, a technical error that exposed the forgery.18
This network, comprising at least 56 profiles, utilized the "stolen faces" of European influencers to build an audience of thousands. The strategic logic is clear: attractive, young female supporters validate the movement's self-image and generate high engagement from followers, which in turn drives ad revenue for the anonymous operators behind the screen.
Chapter 3: Platform Architecture as the Enabler
The proliferation of both state-sponsored and commercial foreign influence was not inevitable; it was facilitated by specific structural changes to the X platform’s architecture between 2023 and 2025.
3.1 The Verification Fallacy: From Identity to Subscription
The dismantling of the legacy "Blue Check" verification system—which required proof of identity and public prominence—and its replacement with a "pay-to-play" subscription model (X Premium) fundamentally broke the platform’s trust mechanism.19
Under the new system, a "verified" badge no longer signified authenticity; it merely signified a payment relationship. This allowed foreign operators to purchase legitimacy for $8 a month. A blue checkmark grants an account prioritized ranking in replies and search results, effectively boosting the visibility of foreign disinformation over non-paying authentic American users.19 For an IO campaign, this is a negligible cost for a massive gain in reach.
3.2 Algorithmic Bias and the "For You" Feed
X’s shift to an algorithmic "For You" feed as the default user experience further amplified the problem. Research indicates that the algorithm prioritizes high-engagement content, which often correlates with polarization and outrage.
A 2025 audit of the platform found that the default feed for German users significantly overrepresented the far-right AfD party compared to other political groups, suggesting a systemic bias toward inflammatory political content.21 Similarly, Reuters Institute data from 2025 showed that the audience on X in the US shifted significantly rightward, with the proportion of users identifying as right-wing tripling after the Musk acquisition.22 Foreign actors, understanding this algorithmic preference, tailor their content to trigger these specific algorithmic rewards, ensuring their fabricated narratives are pushed to millions of passive scrollers.
3.3 The Black Box: API Restrictions and the Blindness of Research
In 2023, X restricted access to its Application Programming Interface (API), implementing prohibitive pricing ($42,000/month for enterprise access) that effectively locked out academic and non-profit researchers.23
This decision had catastrophic consequences for the detection of influence operations:
Loss of Early Warning: Organizations like the Stanford Internet Observatory and university research labs, which had previously identified networks like the Internet Research Agency, could no longer perform large-scale network analysis.24
The Researcher Gap: While legitimate researchers were blinded, state actors and well-funded commercial farms continued to operate using scraping tools and gray-market data. The "Black Box" effect meant that the infestation of the platform went largely unquantified until the platform itself released transparency tools in late 2025.25
Methodological Regression: Researchers were forced to rely on smaller, manual sample sizes, making it difficult to map the full extent of "MAGAflage" networks until they had already achieved critical mass.26
Chapter 4: The November 2025 Transparency Crisis
The latent tensions regarding foreign influence on X erupted into a full-scale crisis of authenticity in November 2025, triggered by the rollout of a new platform feature.
4.1 The "About This Account" Rollout
Facing mounting pressure from European regulators and a desperate need to win back advertisers wary of brand safety, X introduced the "About This Account" feature. This tool allowed users to view the primary country of origin for an account, based on IP address and geolocation data, as well as the history of username changes.17
The rollout was chaotic. Initially, a glitch caused some accounts to incorrectly display "Israel" as their location, leading to conspiracy theories involving the Department of Homeland Security.15 However, once stabilized, the tool provided an unprecedented—and likely unintended—look under the hood of the "MAGA" movement’s online infrastructure.
4.2 The Unmasking
The data revealed a staggering number of high-profile "American patriot" accounts operating from foreign soil.
MAGANationX: A major influencer with nearly 400,000 followers, whose bio read "Patriot Voice for We The People," was revealed to be based in Eastern Europe.17
IvankaNews: A dedicated fan account with over 1 million followers, frequently posting anti-immigration and pro-Trump content, was shown to be operating from Nigeria.17
Motasm A Dalloul: A self-described "Gaza-based journalist" widely cited in discussions on the Israel-Hamas war, was revealed to be posting from Poland.28
Dark Maga: A niche account promoting "Dark MAGA" aesthetics (15k followers) was traced to Thailand.17
4.3 The Reaction: Vindication, Betrayal, and Denial
The revelations triggered a polarized reaction that underscored the deep fractures in the American information ecosystem.
Liberal Vindication:
Progressive influencers and Democratic commentators seized on the data as proof of long-standing allegations. Harry Sisson, a liberal influencer, declared it "one of the greatest days on this platform," viewing the exposure of foreign actors as a "complete vindication" of warnings about the artificial inflation of right-wing support.17
Conservative Betrayal and Paranoia:
For authentic Trump supporters, the revelation was disorienting. Reports surfaced of "growing unease" within conservative circles. Some users expressed feelings of betrayal, with comments like "Trump flipped on us" circulating in response to related news about data collection, reflecting a broader anxiety about surveillance and authenticity.29 The realization that their digital "comrades" were actually foreign grifters threatened the cohesion of the online movement.
Denial and the "VPN Defense":
A significant faction of the MAGA influencers attempted to downplay the findings. They argued that the location data was inaccurate or the result of Virtual Private Network (VPN) usage—a tool common among privacy-conscious conservatives.30 While plausible in individual cases, X’s simultaneous announcement of "VPN alerts" and the sheer clustering of accounts in known click-farm hubs (Lagos, Dhaka) made the "glitch" defense statistically unlikely for the majority of the unmasked accounts.31
Chapter 5: The Content of Discord
The utility of these foreign accounts lies not just in their existence, but in the specific narratives they amplify. The content strategy is a blend of geopolitical sabotage and commercial clickbait.
5.1 Narratives of Decline: Farmland, Borders, and Civil War
A recurring theme amplified by both state and commercial actors is the physical and moral decay of the United States.
The Agricultural Land Narrative:
Foreign accounts heavily amplified concerns regarding foreign ownership of US agricultural land. Leveraging legitimate data about Chinese entities purchasing farmland 32, these accounts spun apocalyptic narratives about the US losing its food sovereignty. This topic is particularly effective because it bridges the gap between legitimate policy concerns (national security) and xenophobic conspiracy theories, making it ideal "MAGAflage" material.33
The Civil War Narrative:
Russian and Iranian actors, in particular, pushed narratives suggesting an inevitable Second American Civil War. By amplifying local news stories about crime or protests and framing them as "the beginning of the end," they aimed to desensitize Americans to the idea of political violence.8
The "Palantir" Surveillance Narrative:
When news broke about the White House contracting Palantir (a company co-founded by Peter Thiel) for a citizen database, foreign accounts amplified the backlash within the MAGA base. By framing this as "Trump flipping on us," they sought to drive a wedge between the President/candidate and his base, maximizing internal chaos.29
5.2 Deepfakes and AI: The Technical Frontier
The content was often delivered via advanced technology.
Whistleblower Deepfakes: The Russian "Doppelganger" network created fake videos of "whistleblowers" alleging corruption. These videos often featured AI-generated voices and faces, lending a veneer of credibility to baseless claims.4
Hate Speech Amplification: A study by USC researchers found that hate speech on X increased by 50% during this period, with racist and homophobic slurs rising significantly.34 This increase was not merely organic; it was fueled by bot networks that amplified inflammatory terms to drive engagement.34
Jackson Hinkle and "MAGA Communism": The ecosystem also elevated syncretic influencers like Jackson Hinkle, who promotes "MAGA Communism"—a blend of pro-Putin, anti-Israel, and populist American rhetoric. Hinkle’s content, which often aligns perfectly with Russian state interests, is heavily amplified by the bot/cyborg networks, illustrating the blurring line between domestic influencers and foreign propaganda.35
Chapter 6: Consequences for American Democracy
The cumulative effect of this "Great Displacement" is a severe degradation of the American democratic process.
6.1 Algorithmic Displacement: Drowning Out the Voter
The most immediate consequence is "Algorithmic Displacement." When a Nigerian engagement farm can generate 100,000 interactions on a post using bot networks and rage-bait, and an authentic American voter sharing a nuanced opinion gets 10 interactions, the algorithm learns to prioritize the farm.
Authentic voices are physically pushed out of the "For You" feed, creating a distorted reality where the "public" appears more radical, more angry, and more divided than it actually is.36 The "online majority" becomes a fabrication, leading politicians to cater to the demands of a digital phantom rather than their actual constituents.
6.2 The Liar's Dividend: The Erosion of Truth
The widespread awareness of these bots—accelerated by the transparency tool—has created a "Liar's Dividend." This concept describes a situation where the prevalence of deepfakes and bots allows bad actors to dismiss genuine evidence as fake.36
If a damaging video of a candidate surfaces, they can simply claim, "It's a Russian deepfake," or "Those are Nigerian bots attacking me." Because the public knows these things exist, the denial becomes plausible. The result is a post-truth environment where no evidence is definitive and trust in all information sources collapses.36
6.3 Regulatory and Legislative Responses
The scale of the threat has prompted legislative action.
The Foster-Kean Letter: Representatives Bill Foster (D-IL) and Tom Kean, Jr. (R-NJ) sent a letter demanding action from social media platforms against foreign bot farms encouraging political violence, highlighting the bipartisan recognition of the threat.37
Future Legislation: Discussions around the "Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act" and updates to the "Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act" reflect a growing desire to tighten the digital and physical borders of the US against this type of infiltration.33
Conclusion
The 2024–2025 period on X represents a cautionary tale of what happens when the safeguards of the digital public square are dismantled in the name of "free speech" and monetization. The "Foreign MAGA" phenomenon is a hydra with many heads: the GRU agent in Moscow seeking geopolitical advantage, the CCP operative in Beijing seeking to discredit democracy, and the student in Lagos seeking a paycheck.
While their motives differ, their methods have converged to produce a singular outcome: the displacement of authentic American discourse. By leveraging AI-generated personas, exploiting the platform’s revenue incentives, and hijacking the aesthetics of American patriotism, these actors have colonized the "MAGA" movement online. The revelation of their presence via the "About This Account" tool is not a solution but a diagnosis of a chronic condition. Without robust identity verification, transparency in algorithmic prioritization, and a rethinking of the "engagement at all costs" business model, the American digital town square will remain a stage for foreign ventriloquists, leaving the actual citizenry shouting into the void.
Table 1: Typology of Foreign "MAGA" Actors on X (2024-2025)
Data synthesized from DOJ indictments 1, Graphika reports 7, Microsoft Threat Intelligence 4, and X Transparency Data.17
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